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Abstract
We design a three periods two generations model to challenge some
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adverse selection and moral hazard. An exogenous stochastic shock
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which removes toxic assets exacerbates the moral hazard problem and
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1 Introduction
The last decade has witnessed nancial crises of an exceptional magnitude.
One of the dening characteristic of these crises centered around assets that
had been regarded as safe but at some point became worthless. Moreover,
the prevailing market structures produced an adverse selection environment
making it next to impossible to separate "good" assets from "toxic" ones. In
response to these dramatic events a plethora of government programs have
been developed. For instance, in the 2008 crisis, the U.S. government chose
to directly remove "troubled assets" from the market (among other things).1
The most prominent example is the TARP scheme which had initially allo-
cated up to $700 billion for that purpose.2 In the context of the Greek debt
crisis, policies were much more diverse and complicated. Nonetheless, in the
nal analysis the policy responses involved reducing the exposure of private
banks to Greek debt (largely through ECB measures) and providing public
guarantees on a large part of the remaining debt (see e.g. Arslanalp and
Tsuda, 2012, p. 50 Annex Figure 1).
While there is a prevailing sentiment that these government measures
were essential to stabilize the system in the middle of the turmoil, the ac-
tual policies have raised concerns on several grounds. One of the main mis-
givings centers around fairness issues summarized by rhetorics around the
buzz-phrases "privatizing prots and socializing losses" or "Main Street vs.
Wall Street". Such policies appear particularly unfair since it means that
while investors were expecting to keep their prots in good times, they could
shed their loss during a crisis. Moreover, as most governments used debt
to nance their respective policies, additional intergenerational equity issues
were voiced.3 Further concerns regard the impact of moral hazard on re-
source allocation once the policy is anticipated. Intuitively, the intervention
amounts to a subsidy of investorsreturn in the bad state of the world.4 If
1There is an immense body of literature discussing the events leading to that crisis.
For a succinct overview see Blanchard (2009).
2The goals of the program may be found in
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1150.htm For details of the program, see
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/tarpinfo.htm. Other countries have im-
plemented similar programs. For instance, in Ireland through the National Asset
Management Agency, or in numerous other European countries via a "Bad Bank"
concept, see Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson (2009).
3For instance, Tagkalakis (2013) studies the signicant increase in national debt due
to nancial crises in OECD countries. With respect to the 2008 crisis, he notes that "the
debt to GDP ratio increased due to nancial rescue packages" (see p. 199).
4This concern is also reected by Katsimi and Moutos (2010, p. 575), who note that
"(I)mplicit loan guarantees provided by governments have also intensied private-sector
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this is anticipated, it induces investors to ignore the down risk and over-invest
in risky assets.5
There is a recent literature briey overviewed below explaining the col-
lapse of nancial markets and lending freezes based on informational frictions.
A natural component of that research program is to consider public policies
aimed at restoring condence in adverse states of the world. Notwithstanding
the ndings of that line of investigation, the aim of our paper is to show that
the aforementioned fairness and moral-hazard arguments cannot be used to
rule out intervention even when nancial markets operate smoothly.
For that purpose, we introduce a stylized model with which we perform
a qualitative logical exercise. The model uses a three periods and two over-
lapping generations framework.6 The key element is the introduction of an
intermediate good traded across risk-neutral generations in a secondary asset
market.7 In that context, a crisis is characterized by the following features.
Before intermediate goods are traded, it becomes common knowledge that a
fraction of them have turned worthless. Moreover, adverse selection impairs
trade because buyers cannot distinguish across assets. As a result, the price
of all intermediate goods becomes depressed by the worthless assets referred
to hereafter as "toxic".8
In the absence of a public intervention, the rational expectations equi-
librium leads to underinvestment in safe goods and overinvestment in the
risky ones relative to the rst-best allocation. A tax nanced policy which
removes a fraction of the toxic assets at market price is shown to increase
all investments. However, it turns out to be welfare decreasing. Intuitively,
the rational expectations price always adjusts to fully incorporate the market
risk. When toxic assets are removed the market risk understates the social
risk, which cannot be welfare improving with risk-neutral individuals.
moral hazard" as "(U)nderpriced loan guarantees .... lead to greater lending, due to the
lower cost of capital, and as well riskier lending." See also Taglakakis (2013, p. 198) for a
related observation.
5These concerns are reected in President Obamas speech at Wall Street on
the rst anniversary of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, where he said: "Those
on Wall Street cannot resume taking risks without regard for consequences, and
expect that next time, American taxpayers will be there to break their fall."
http://www.hu¢ ngtonpost.com/2009/09/14/obama-wall-streetspeech_ n_285841.html
6Bental and Demougin (2014) use a standard OG framework with similar conclusions.
The current version greatly simplies the derivation of asset prices.
7The idea is taken from the paper by Bencivenga, Smith and Starr (1996).
8The adjective "toxic" is commonly associated with assets whose value suddenly drops,
causing markets to freeze when due to adverse selection owners of "good" assets withdraw
from the market (see, e.g. Morris and Shin 2012). We use this terminology even though
in our setting toxicity does not lead to market collapse.
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While the foregoing analysis seems to lend support to opponents of in-
tervention, we argue that its conclusion is in fact a "knife-edge" result. For
that purpose, we consider two minor extensions of the basic model. In the
rst extension, we introduce search for yield which has been often identied
as a main culprit contributing to recent nancial crises (see, e.g. the ECBs
2014 Financial Stability Review). We identify a condition which guarantees
that in the presence of dynamic search externalities removing some of the
toxic goods becomes socially benecial. Intuitively, "socializing losses" acts
like a subsidy of investors return. It increases search by the rst genera-
tion which has a positive spillover e¤ect on the next generation. On the
whole, the policy trades-o¤ a worsening in the resource allocation of savings
across investment alternatives against an improved allocation in search and
knowledge creation. It is noteworthy that the second generation also benets
from the intervention program, thus alleviating some of the intergenerational
"fairness" concerns.9
The second extension focuses on the "Main Street vs. Wall Street" ten-
sion. To do so, we introduce a labor market characterized by sticky wages.
Ex-post, this feature implies an ine¢ cient allocation of labor. In this context,
a policy of removing toxic goods has two e¤ects. As above, it acts as a capital
subsidy and raises investments. Due to the complementarity of factors, de-
mand for labor increases in all states of the world. In and of itself, this has a
positive welfare e¤ect. More importantly, the policy stabilizes the price of the
intermediate good during a crisis. In view of the pre-determined wages, this
is welfare improving.10 Intuitively, the stable price avoids a sharp decrease in
labor demand during the crisis which would have exacerbated the ine¢ cient
labor allocation. Altogether the two extensions demonstrate that the heuris-
tic intuition derived from competitive environments is quite fragile, and that
realistic deviations from this environment overturn the knife-edge negative
conclusion with respect to the desirability of direct government intervention
in the capital market.
9The intergenerational externality underlying intervention would also justify direct sub-
sidization. This raises the question as to whether society may not be better o¤ using direct
tools to align incentives. Our study does not provide an answer to this important question
as we do not conduct a cost-benet analysis across di¤erent subsidy schemes. However, in
practice governments are unlikely to correctly identify and subsidize all innovative activi-
ties (including among others developments of new nancial instruments, new management
and marketing methods, etc.) while avoiding opportunistic behavior at the receiving end.
If this is the case, the remaining intergenerational externalities should continue to warrant
some intervention based on the above justication, albeit to a lesser extent.
10A similar observation to footnote 9 applies, as we do not include other corrective
instruments. However, as is known from the new Keynesian literature, governmental
policies cannot fully restore e¢ ciency in face of labor market frictions (see e.g. Gali 2008).
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Our analysis is related to the large body of research that has developed in
wake of the recent nancial turmoils. A large part of that research also singled
out adverse selection as the key characteristic. However, unlike our analy-
sis the focus of that literature has been on nancial intermediation and the
negative impact of informational asymmetries on trade between lenders and
borrowers. That negative impact may even completely freeze the market.11
Hence, removing the worst assets reduces the adverse e¤ect of hidden infor-
mation and may restore trade (see, among others, Thakur 2015, Guerrieri
and Shimer 2014, Dang, Gorton and Holmström 2013, Tirole 2012, Bebchuk
2009). The analysis of Holmström and Tirole (1998, 2011) emphasizes in
addition the adverse impact of a crisis on the collateral value of assets which
is shown to magnify the downturn in the real economy. Further contribu-
tions view the crisis as a new version of the standard Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) bank-run argument (e.g. Gorton and Metrick 2012, Uhlig 2010 and
Keister 2015). Notwithstanding the importance of intermediation, our analy-
sis indicates that removing toxic assets may be benecial even when capital
markets operate smoothly. In that respect our ndings should be understood
as complementary to the nancial intermediation literature.12
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model discussing
technology and agents. The initial environment without informational fric-
tions is analyzed in section 3. In section 4, we study the e¤ect of adverse
selection and show that in our example intervention is not desirable. The
fragility of this conclusion is demonstrated in section 5 which consists of the
two extensions mentioned above. The nal section o¤ers some concluding
remarks.
2 The Model
We consider an economy which exists for three periods. At t = 1; 2 gener-
ations of two-period lived agents appear. Both generations have the same
size.
All members of both generations receive an endowment X of a good in
the rst period of their lives but only care about expected consumption in
the second period of their lives. Given their preferences, agents must use
saving technologies to transfer resources to the second period of their life.
11In our case, the assumption of two-period lived individuals guarantees that trade
always takes place, since owners of good assets sell them at any price.
12Bianchi (2012) also discusses tradeo¤s generated by the moral-hazard impact of gov-
ernment intervention. In his DSGE model, a government policy transfering resources to
rms whenever capital-market frictions become binding is welfare enhancing .
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There are three potential saving technologies; storage that converts time-t
units of X into the same quantity of the time-t + 1 consumption good, and
two technologies indexed by H and L. Technology i = H;L converts K units
of time-t good into iF (K) time-t + 1 consumption and iG(K) time-t + 1
intermediate goods whereby H > L. The latter are sold in a secondary
market and stochastically turn into time-t+ 2 consumption. Both G and F
are increasing concave functions satisfying the Inada conditions.
Intermediate goods are indistinguishable from one another and their ori-
gin is private information. However, with probability  a "crisis" may occur
at t = 2 (hereafter we denote the "crisis" and "no crisis" states by "s = c" and
"s = n"). In state c intermediate goods originating from the H-technology
become useless and are referred to hereafter as "toxic". In all other cases,
time-t+1 intermediate goods convert into the same quantity of the time-t+2
consumption goods.
All agents have access to the linear storage technology. However, only a
fraction H of generation 1 and 'H of generation 2 young agents have access
to the H-technology. The complementary fractions L and 'L, can only use
technology L.
The economy has a government which may intervene in the case of a
crisis, committing itself at the beginning of time to remove a fraction  of
toxic goods. Due to the informational structure concerning the origin of
these goods, the policy o¤ers to buy them at the current market price. This
o¤er is weakly incentive compatible and owners of intermediate goods are
assumed to correctly self-select. The government uses lump-sum taxes to
nance interventions. We denote by T and T the respective tax paid by
members of the rst and second generations during a crisis. For the sake of
parsimony, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: F (K) = G(K) = 2K1=2.
Assumption 2: Without loss of generality H =  > L = 1.
The setup implies that agents born in t = 1 allocate their savings either to
storage or the respective concave technology (hereafter primary investment).
Intermediate goods are sold to agents born at t = 2 in the secondary mar-
ket. Agents born at t = 2 split their endowment between storage, primary
investments and intermediate goods bought in the secondary market.
Assumption 3: The endowment X is su¢ ciently large to guarantee that in
the respective equilibria of the ensuing setups all optimal investment problems
have interior solutions.
The timing in the economy is as follows. First, the government announces
a contingent policy (; T; T ) implemented in case of a crisis. Second, at t = 1
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generation 1 appears and is endowed. Moreover, nature allocates technology
to members of generation 1. Third, these members decide on the allocation
of their savings across storage and primary investment. Fourth, at t = 2
generation 2 appears and is endowed. Fifth, nature selects the state and
allocates technology to members of generation 2. Depending on the state,
the policy is implemented. Sixth, the secondary market opens; members of
the second generation allocate their saving across storage, primary invest-
ments and intermediate goods from the secondary market while generation
1 consumes. Finally, at t = 3 generation 2 consumes.
Before solving for the equilibrium, we briey elaborate on some of critical
features of the model. The assumption that individuals care only about
second period consumption allows us to eliminate the saving decision and
focus attention on the allocation across assets. The assumption of joint
production captures the notion that investment produces consumption in
the following period as well as future potential productive capacity. To x
ideas, consider the following metaphor taken from Bental and Demougin
(2014); K stands for seedlings which grow into trees in the following period
producing iF (K) fruits and iG(K) new seedlings. Next period, the new
seedlings transform one to one into fruit except during a crisis where seedlings
originating from H-trees wither without producing fruit. Our setup fully
associates "toxicity" with the H-technology. We chose this dichotomous
structure in order to emphasize the tension between yield and aggregate risk.
In that respect, the two state specication and the assumption that in the
crisis the true value of toxic assets is zero are made purely for convenience.
Removing the latter assumption would allow for the possibility that some of
the government-owned assets may generate prots.
3 The No Friction Case
In order to identify the role of the various frictions, we rst consider the
case where the origin of intermediate goods is common knowledge thereby
removing the adverse selection issue. Let p denote the rationally expected
price of intermediate goods which generate period 3 consumption. First-
generation L-individuals face no risk. Accordingly, they solve:
max
0KLX
F (KL) + pG(KL) +X  KL (1)
In contrast, rst generation H-individuals face the risk that with probability
 their intermediate goods will not be productive and have no value. Hence,
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they solve:
max
0KHX
F (KH) + (1  ) pG(KH) +X  KH (2)
Since the economy ends at period 3, intermediate goods generated by the
primary investments of the second generation have no value. Nevertheless,
members of that generation engage in primary investment and in storage.
Moreover, they can purchases some of the (productive) intermediate inputs
produced by generation 1. Accordingly, j-individuals of that generation,
j = H;L, solve:
max
Kj ;Sj ;gj
jF (Kj) + Sj + gj (3)
s:t:
Kj + Sj + pgj = X; Kj; Sj; gj  0
where gj denotes the amount of intermediate inputs purchased. Given that
there are no market failures in the current environment, the resulting alloca-
tion is Pareto optimal and denoted hereafter by the superscript PE.
By Assumption 3, the no-arbitrage condition implies pPE = 1. Using
this observation the rst-order conditions from (1)-(3) implicitly dene rst-
best investments, KPEi ; K
PE
j where by convention i and j index, respectively,
generations 1 and 2, and i; j = H;L.
4 Adverse Selection
In this section, we return to the setup where the origin of intermediate goods
is unknown to second-generation buyers and study the impact of adverse
selection on the economy. For that purpose, we introduce the fraction s,
s = c; n of period 2 intermediate goods that will transform into period 3
consumption goods. In the "no-crisis" state, n = 1, hence the no-arbitrage
condition between storage and intermediate goods implies pn = 1.
In the case of a crisis, c is endogenous and depends on the fraction H
of H-individuals in the population, their investments relative to total rst
generation investment, and on the government policy. At the individual level
c is taken as given. Due to the adverse selection issue, it determines the
expected return on intermediate goods. Together with risk-neutrality, by
Assumption 3 the no-arbitrage condition implies:
pc = c (4)
8
In a rational expectations equilibrium members of the rst generation will
accurately predict the contingent prices ps; s = n; c. Being risk-neutral,
these individuals will use the expected price
p = (1  )  1 +   c (5)
to determine their respective investment choices.
4.1 First generation investment
Individual i born at t = 1 faces the following budget constraint
X = Ki + Si (6)
where Ki and Si respectively denote primary investment and storage. At
t = 2 expected consumption by individual i is given by:
Ci = iF (Ki) + piG(Ki) + Si   T (7)
Since individuals only care about second period consumption their optimal
investment solves:
U1i (p) = max
0KiX
iF (Ki) + piG(Ki) + (X  Ki)  T (8)
Given Assumptions 1 and 3, primary investments follow from the rst-order
conditions implying:
iF
0 (Ki ) + piG
0(Ki )  1 = 0) Ki = 2i (1 + p)2 (9)
4.2 Second generation investment
When the second generation makes investment decisions the state of the
world is already common knowledge. Accordingly, in state s individual j
faces the following budget constraint:
X = psgsj + S
s
j +K
s
j + 
sT (10)
where gsj denotes the amount of the intermediate good bought by j in state
s and s is an indicator function taking the value 1 at s = c (i.e. when the
contingent policy is implemented) and 0 otherwise. Decision by individual j
is state s yields the following expected consumption:
Csj = 
sgsj + S
s
j + jF (K
s
j ) (11)
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From the respective no-arbitrage conditions we have sgsj +S
s
j = p
sgsj +S
s
j =
X  Ksj   sT where the second equality follows from the budget constraint
(10). Using this observation, the utility of j becomes:
U2;sj = max
0KsjX
jF
 
Ksj

+X  Ksj   sT . (12)
From the rst-order condition, we nd that the optimal choice of Ksj is state-
independent. Slightly abusing notation, we obtain by Assumption 1:
Kj = 
2
j (13)
Observe that in the current setup, apart from taxation, members of gen-
eration 2 are completely insulated from the crisis and from the investment
decisions of the rst generation. This follows because in an interior solution
the storage technology serves as a bu¤er guaranteeing that the intermediate
good price correctly reects the average third-period output it generates.
4.3 Equilibrium
In this section, we derive the rational expectations equilibrium. At t = 1,
before generation 1 individuals allocate their saving, they know their endow-
ments, their respective type and the contingent policy (; T; T ). From (9)
that policy does not directly a¤ect t = 1 investments. However, it impacts
investment indirectly through changes in p = 1   + c.
In order to evaluate c observe that in a crisis the market supply of
intermediate goods per member of the second generation is:
Gc = LG(K

L) + (1  )HG(KH) (14)
Out of that supply only the fraction LG(K

L) generates third period con-
sumption, implying:
c =
LG(K

L)
LG(K

L) + (1  )HG(KH)
(15)
We now exploit Assumption 1 to explicitly solve for the rationally expected
(average) price p.
Lemma 1 Under rational expectations, in the crisis the fraction of non-toxic
assets remaining in the market is given by
RE =
L
L + (1  )H2
, (16)
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and the expected (average) price becomes
pRE = 1   (1  )H
2
L + (1  )H2
(17)
Proof. From Assumption 1 and (9), we obtain the relationship KH = 
2KL
for generation 1 individuals. Using the denition of the production functions
(15) becomes:
c =
L2K
1=2
L
L2K
1=2
L + (1  )H22K1=2L
(18)
verifying (16) by cancelling common terms. The second part of the claim
follows directly by substituting (16) into (5) and rearranging terms.
Proposition 2 In the rational expectations equilibrium, primary investments
of generation 1 individuals are given by KREi = 
2
i

2   (1 )H2
1 L+(1 )H2
2
and are therefore increasing in the policy parameter .
Proof. Follows immediately from the proof of Lemma 1 and (9).
Intuitively, by o¤ering to buy "toxic assets" at market price the gov-
ernment makes it incentive compatible for H-individuals to sell their inter-
mediate goods to the policy scheme. Consequently, the remaining supply
of intermediate goods to the market includes a lower fraction of toxic ones
(equation 14) increasing their average return. By the no-arbitrage condi-
tion, this raises the crisis price of the intermediate good (equation 15) and
therefore the expected equilibrium price. The latter induces a corresponding
response in primary investments.
To conclude this section we briey discuss the impact of  on equilibrium
primary investments of generation 1 in comparison to the Pareto e¢ cient
solution of section 3. In the latter case, we know from the optimization
problems (1)-(2) that e¢ cient investments are characterized by:
F 0(KPEL ) + p
PEG0(KPEL ) = 1 = 

F 0(KPEH ) + (1  ) pPEG0(KPEH )

(19)
with pPE = 1. In contrast, the equilibrium generated by the contingent
policy (; T; T ) is characterized by pRE  1 and by:
F 0(KREL ) + p
REG0(KREL ) = 1 = F
0(KREH ) + p
REG0(KREH ) (20)
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We denote by KREi () the rational expectations investments associated with
a policy that removes the fraction  of toxic assets from the market. At  = 1,
we have pRE = 1 and therefore a rst-generation L-individual sets KREL (1) =
KPEL , i.e. invests e¢ ciently, while H sets K
RE
H (1) > K
PE
H . Intuitively, H
overinvests because he does not internalize the potential output loss.
However, the resulting equilibrium cannot be second-best e¢ cient. To
see this, consider a small reduction in  away from 1. This would reduce
pRE and therefore both investments. The rst-order e¤ect of the reduction
in KREH () is strictly Pareto improving while at the margin the reduction in
KL away from the Pareto optimal investment has only a second-order e¤ect.
At the other extreme with  = 0, we have (1  ) < p < 1. Accordingly,
L-investments are penalized whileH-investments continue to benet from the
presence of adverse selection in the market. Consequently, L-individuals are
induced to underinvest, KREL (0) < K
PE
L , but H-individuals still overinvest,
KREH (0) > K
PE
H . Notice however that K
RE
H (1) > K
RE
H (0) so that the distor-
tion in the H-investments is reduced. To further evaluate the intervention
policy, we now introduce a social welfare function.
4.4 Welfare analysis
We dene social welfare as the sum of the per person expected utility across
both generations. Accordingly, given a contingent policy (; T; T ), welfare
at the rational expectations equilibrium becomes
WRE = LU
1
L(p
RE) + HU
1
H(p
RE) +
(1  ) 'LU2;nL + 'HU2;nH +  'HU2;cL + 'HU2;cH  (21)
Feasibility of the policy requires that the taxes levied during a crisis should
be su¢ cient to just nance the asset buyout program. Accordingly, the
crisis-contingent government budget constraint becomes:
T + T = pc;REHG(KREH ) (22)
where pc;RE denotes the rational expectations equilibrium price of the sec-
ondary investments in the crisis state.
Using the government budget constraint and the respective denitions of
utilities, we can rewrite (21) as:
WRE = L

F (KREL ) +G(K
RE
L ) +
 
X  KREL

+ H

F (KREH ) + (1  )G(KREH ) +
 
X  KREH

+
P
j 'j

jF (K
RE
j ) +
 
X  KREj
 (23)
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Not surprisingly, due to the linearity of utilities, the economys welfare is
equivalent to the economys aggregate expected output. Based on this ob-
servation, we provide a formal proof of the following result in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 Under rational expectations and assuming that agentstypes
are exogenously given, a "no intervention" policy which sets  = 0 is e¢ cient.
To gain some insight into this result, observe from (17) that KREL and
KREH are functions of p
RE. However, from (20) pRE, and hence also welfare,
are functions of . Taking the derivative of (23) with respect to , we obtain:
@W
@
=

L
1  pRE
1 + pRE
@KREL
@pRE
+ H
1    pRE
1 + pRE
@KREH
@pRE

@pRE
@
(24)
Using (9), to solve for the e¤ect of pRE on the respective investments and
substituting for pRE from (17), the derivative in (24) simplies to:
@W
@
=  2 HL
2
L + (1  )H2
@pRE
@
(25)
From (17), we know @p
RE
@
> 0 so that @W
@
 0 and vanishes at  = 0. In
order to gain some insight on this rather technical result, observe from (17)
that the rational expectations price in the secondary market satises:
pRE  L + (1  )H2 = 1  L + (1  ) (1  )H2 : (26)
The term in the square bracket on the RHS of (26) measures the expected
numbers of secondary goods traded in the secondary market that turn into
period-t + 2 consumption goods. In the absence of adverse selection, we
know that the market would have traded these intermediate goods at a price
of 1 due to the no-arbitrage requirement with the storage technology. The
square bracket on the LHSmeasures the number of intermediate goods traded
and reects the presence of adverse selection. Due to the risk-neutrality the
rational expectations price adjusts to fully incorporate the market risk faced
by the buyers.
For  > 0 the market risk understates the social risk. The latter is given
by the expected numbers of secondary goods present in the economy that turn
into period-t+2 consumption goods, i.e. L+(1  )H2. However, in the
presence of risk-neutral traders this cannot be optimal. Intuitively, with risk
neutrality the allocation of risk is una¤ected by a potential intervention, while
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resource allocation is distorted.13 Hence, despite the ine¢ cient investment
allocation generated by adverse selection, removing toxic assets using a tax
nanced scheme is never welfare enhancing.
5 Robustness
We designed the foregoing model in order to map standard objections against
a policy designed at removing toxic assets. By construction, the models
conclusion lends support to opponents of intervention. However, whether
Proposition 3 is truly useful or only a "knife-edge" result obtained by a
lucky combination of assumptions depends on whether the foregoing nding
is robust to variations in the environment.
In the remainder, we consider two rather minor deviations from the fore-
going model.14 We selected the variations according to two criteria; we tried
to minimize changes of the initial model to a minimum and, attempted to
represent some of the aspects which have been at the center of the public
debate on the desirability of intervention. In the rst extension, we intro-
duce a search for yield and include a spillover e¤ect across generations to
capture the idea that tomorrows discoveries build on past ndings. In the
second extension, we add a labor market. Intuitively, we try to capture the
idea that a crisis in the market for assets will naturally feed back into other
segments of the economy and in particular to the labor market. This in turn
should a¤ect future generations and may justify having them participate in
nancing an intervention policy.
5.1 Search for yield
"Search for yield" has been perceived by many observers as a major con-
tributing factor to the recent nancial crises. Moreover, it continues to be
regarded as a potential destabilizer of nancial markets (see, e.g. section 2
of the ECBs 2014 Financial Stability Review).15 A policy of removing toxic
13In contrast, with risk-averse agents some insurance would become e¢ cient which sug-
gests some form of intervention. In a former version of this paper we used that feature to
justify intervention (see Bental and Demougin 2014).
14In Bental and Demougin (2014) we studied a di¤erent extension. There we considered
a standard OG model with risk-averse agent and also found that removing some of the
toxic assets was benecial.
15The report argues that in some segments of the market "investor behaviour is consis-
tent with an intense search for yield, the sharp unwinding of which could have broad-based
consequences for global nancial markets" (p. 47). For similar concerns on the develop-
ments in China at the beginning of 2016, see the NY-Times article "Toxic Loans Around
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assets would seem to exacerbate the harmful externality encompassed in the
hunt for yield. In and of itself this observation speaks against such a policy.
However, focusing on the negative impact of search for yield ignores potential
benets in normal times which is at the core of this extension.
Specically, in the foregoing setup, adverse selection guaranteed that hav-
ing access to the high-yield technology is advantageous. The extension ex-
ploits this feature by introducing a search for the high-yield technologies. In
addition, we include a dynamic spillover e¤ect. What we have in mind is
that past discoveries spill over to future generations, an idea that has been
incorporated in many endogenous growth models (see e.g. Romer 1990).16
In the sequel, it is useful to adjust notation. Specically, we dene  =
H , ' = 'H and denote by  () and (';) the respective search cost of the
rst and second generations measured in utility units. These functions are
assumed increasing and convex in their respective search variable and satisfy
the Inada condition. We capture the spillover e¤ect by assuming  (:) < 0.
In order to incorporate these changes into the foregoing model, we mod-
ify the economys timing as follows. In the rst period, after the policy
announcement (; T; T ) members of the rst generation determine . Na-
ture then allocates types in accordance with  and investment decisions are
made. Analogously, in the second period members of generation 2 select '
after nature has determined the state of the world, but before making their
investment decisions.
Adjusting the rational expectations equilibrium involves solving for pRE
and RE. Specically, given RE and  the rationally expected price pRE
follows from (17). On the other hand, given pRE every member of generation 1
optimally chooses his search variable,  by equating his marginal search costs
to the associated marginal benet. Finally, rational expectations requires
consistency, i.e.  = RE. Altogether, the equilibrium is dened by:8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
pRE = 1   (1  )
RE2
1  RE + (1  )RE2
U1H(p
RE)  U1L(pRE) =  0()
 = RE
(27)
the World Weigh on Global Growth" of Feb 3, 2016.
16As indicated in footnote 9, the search for yield represents any type of innovative
activities including nancial innovations, management and marketing pratices and the
like. The externalities encompassed in such activities are best captured by the famous
Newton reference from a letter to Hooke, in 1676: "If I have seen a little further, it is by
standing on the shoulders of Giants."
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Lemma 4 For every  there is a unique rational expectations equilibrium 
pRE(); RE()

. In that equilibrium, search by the rst generation is an
increasing function of .
Proof. From the equilibrium system (27), we substitute the rst equation
into the second and use the denition of A(; ) from (A1). The value of
RE is implicitly dened as the solution to:
 (; ) = U1H(1  A (; ))  U1L(1  A (; ))   0() = 0 : (28)
In order to verify existence given , observe that at  = 0 the LHS of (28) is
positive whereas it becomes innitely negative for ! 1. By continuity and
the intermediate value theorem an equilibrium exists. Uniqueness is obtained
by observing that  < 0. The second result follows because  > 0.
The result has a straightforward intuition. Increasing the fraction of
toxic assets removed during a crisis has two e¤ects; it requires an adjustment
in taxation and raises p. Since informational asymmetry implies uniform
taxation across types, the change in taxation has no direct impact on the
utility di¤erential (U1H   U1L). In contrast, with H > L the increased pRE
raises the utility di¤erential thereby inducing more search.
The choice of RE() by generation 1 has a spillover impact on the opti-
mization problem by members of the next generation. Applying the notation
from (12), the search decision problem of a young generation 2 individual be-
comes
max
'
(1  ')U2;sL + 'U2;sH   (';RE()). (29)
The corresponding search is implicitly dened by:
U2;sH   U2;sL = v'(';RE()): (30)
Using (13) to substitute the utility maximizing choice of Kj = 
2
j , the LHS
of (30) becomes
U2;sH   U2;sL =

HF
 
2H
  2H  LF  2L  2L (31)
which is a constant. By convexity and the Inada condition of (;), (30)
has a unique solution. That solution will respond to variation in  through
change in RE() and is denoted hereafter by 'RE(). Based on a proof
provided in the Appendix, we have the following result.
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Proposition 5 Some intervention is desirable provided that at  = 0,
j
 
'RE(0);RE(0)
 j > 22  2  A(0; RE(0) : (32)
Proposition 5 has a natural intuition. Consider a marginal increase in 
at the point  = 0. By Lemma 4, it induces rst generation individuals to
search more. Condition (32) captures the implications of that change.
The LHS of (32) represents the positive spillover e¤ect on the second gen-
erations search cost. The RHS captures the negative e¤ect due to worsened
adverse selection in the intermediate goods market. Whether some amount
of intervention is useful depends on which of these two e¤ects dominates.
Clearly, when the crisis probability is su¢ ciently small the positive spillover
externality prevails.
Search for high return (e.g. through the creation of complex nancial
assets) has been viewed by many as an instigator of toxic assets in the recent
nancial crisis. As a natural consequence, people have argued against inter-
vention schemes which in e¤ect subsidize searchers by shielding them from
the potential social loss they generate. The setup leading to Proposition 3
mimics this situation concluding that without intergenerational spillover a
search subsidy is undesirable. However, dynamic linkages may overturn this
conclusion as shown by Proposition 5. Moreover, from the point of view of
intergenerational equity, the assumption that future generations are likely
to benet from innovations made by their predecessors may justify partially
insuring searchers for high yield through the intervention policy.
Before ending this subsection a remark is in order. In our setup, insuring
searchers can only be achieved through a buyout of toxic assets during a
crisis. By design this rules out the possibility that another (not modelled)
instrument could perfectly correct the market failure, thereby eliminating
the rationale of removing toxic assets altogether.17 However, in practice such
instruments are unlikely to exists; it is implausible that governments can cor-
rectly identify and subsidize all innovative activities (including among others
developments of new nancial instruments, new organizational forms, new
management and marketing methods, etc.) and avoid opportunistic behav-
ior at the receiving end. Accordingly, even if we were to include additional
instruments, there would remain some scope for intervention based on the
rationale developed in our analysis, albeit to a lesser extent.
17Observe that even if perfectly corrective instruments were to exist, our conclusion
would remain valid. Though intervention would indeed become redundant, it would not
be so on the basis of the commonly invoked moral hazard and fairness concerns. Instead,
the argument should be grounded on the existence of other, better performing instruments.
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5.2 Labor
Intervention schemes during the 2008 crisis have not been designed solely to
"save Wall street". As clearly stated by Henry Paulson, the U.S. Secretary of
the Treasury at the time, the main goal was to "save Main street", i.e. "save
our economy from a catastrophe".18 Berger and Roman (2016) provide a
pioneering empirical analysis of the real e¤ects of the TARP program. They
show that the program "statistically and economically signicantly increased
net job creation and net hiring establishments".19 In this vein, this subsection
aims at addressing the real e¤ect of intervention.
For this purpose, we extend the initial model by incorporating a labor
market characterized by a friction in the wage setting process leading to
wage stickiness. Specically, wages are determined by a centralized bargain-
ing procedure between a producersrepresentative ("employerscouncil") and
a union. While this scheme resembles wage negotiations in Germany, other
assumptions which create frictions in the labor market would generate sim-
ilar results (as for instance in standard new Keynesian models, e.g. Erceg,
Henderson, and Levin 2000). Our assumptions on the bargaining procedure
were chosen to preserve the basic features of the initial setup.20
We adjust the original framework as follows. Generation t produces
through its primary investment time t + 1 capital. That capital can be
combined with time t + 1 labor in order to generate t + 1 consumption and
intermediate goods. Using N to denote labor input, we replace the produc-
tion functions of Assumption 1 with the following:
Assumption 1: F (K;N) = G(K;N) = K1=4N1=2.
Labor is provided by members of the young generation who have the
ability to supply  units of labor at a utility cost C() = . The wage
is negotiated using a Nash bargaining process. For these negotiations, the
respective outside options of the parties are zero for labor and the salvage
value K with 0 <  < 1 for the producer. Negotiations take place before the
state s is realized. After s becomes known producers determine employment
based on the negotiated wage.
As an artifact of the three-periods-two-generations structure, the labor
market will only be active in period 2. It is inactive in period 1 because
there is no previous generation of employers, and in period 3 since there is
18The Paulson quote appears as a motto in the paper of Berger and Roman (2016).
19Specically, their result "suggests that over the 16 quarters of the post-TARP period
(2009:Q1-2012:Q4), for every 1000 people, 8.09 jobs were created due to TARP".
20To be specic, our version of the sticky-wage economy yields closely related pricing
functions for the intermediate goods. The key equations to see this are (16) and (40)
below.
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no third generation that could be employed. Together with Assumption 1,
it implies that members of the second generation will not undertake primary
investments.
These adjustments in the model leave the no-arbitrage conditions between
intermediate goods and storage una¤ected so that pn = 1 and pc = c.
However, in order to solve for c, we need to analyze the production decisions
of rst generation L and H-individuals.
5.2.1 Labor contract and investment
We solve the economy by backward induction starting with employment de-
cisions in period 2. Consider individual i of generation 1 who had invested
Ki units of capital in the rst period. Given a state s and a wage w that
individuals demand for labor, N si (w), is determined by the solution of the
optimization problem:
i(Ki; p
s; w) = max
Li
iF (Ki; Ni) + p
siG(Ki; Ni)  wNi (33)
Moving backwards, consider the negotiations stage. At that point in time,
the union rationally anticipates the labor demand N si (w) and computes the
expected rent of a representative worker. By Assumption 1that expected
rent becomes:
U(w) = (w   1) f(1  ) [(1  )NnL(w) + NnH(w)]
+  [(1  )N cL(w) + N cH(w)]g :
(34)
where (1  )N sL(w) + N sH(w) yields the average employment in state s
and (w   1) denotes the representative workers net benet per unit of labor.
Similarly, the employerscouncil will rationally anticipate the i(Ki; ps; w)
when it computes the average rent, AR, associated with w:
AR(w) = (1  ) [(1  ) L(KL; pn; w) + H(KH ; pn; w)]
+ [(1  ) L(KL; pc; w) + H(KH ; pc; w)]   [(1  )KL + KH ] :
(35)
Nash-negotiation with equal bargaining power implies that the union and the
employerscouncil split the total rent equally. Hence, the negotiated wage is
implicitly dened by the equation
AR(w) = U(w) . (36)
In the Appendix, we prove the following result.
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Lemma 6 Assuming generation 1 individuals of type-i have invested Ki and
the parties anticipate pc, the union and the employerscouncil negotiate the
wage
w(KL; KH ; p
c) =
vuuth(1  ) +  (1+pc)24 i [(1  )K0:5L + 2K0:5H ]
 [(1  )KL + KH ] (37)
Further applying backward induction, we now move to period 1 and con-
sider the primary investment decision by a member of the rst generation.
From the perspective of that individual, his own weight in the economy is
negligible. Hence, he will perceive w and pc as exogenous parameters. Ac-
cordingly, individual i solves:
Ui = max
Ki
(1  ) i(Ki; pn; w) +  [i(Ki; pc; w)  T ] +X  Ki (38)
At the rational expectations equilibrium, given the wage wRE and the
crisis price pc;RE, the optimization (38) delivers KREi . In turn, equation (37)
requires that in equilibrium
wRE = w(KREL ; K
RE
H ; p
c;RE): (39)
This observation allows us to derive the following result proven in the Ap-
pendix.
Proposition 7 The rational expectations wage is wRE = 2=. Moreover, in
the crisis, the fraction of non-toxic assets present in the market is given by
RE =
1  
1  + (1  )4 . (40)
which by (4) also yields the crisis price pc;RE of intermediate goods.
Altogether, in the current extension the price structure of the intermedi-
ate good closely resembles that of the initial framework.
5.2.2 Results
Due to the analytical complexity of the foregoing setup, we turn to a numeri-
cal exercise. That exercise produces a simple counter-example casting doubt
on the allocative concerns and the unfairness often ascribed to intervention.
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Figure 1: Economys performance
Figure 1 presents the models performance for the parameter values  =
1:5,  = 0:2,  = 0:1 and  = 0:75. Starting with the upper left panel,
the rst graphic shows that pc;RE is increasing in  (see 40). It reects
that removing a larger fraction of toxic goods in the crisis raises the average
return on intermediate goods traded in the market which increases their price.
Moreover, due to the arbitrage condition with the linear storage technology,
pc;RE converges to pn = 1 when all toxic goods are removed. The upper right
graphic displays the impact of  on capital investment by L-individuals.
That investment is increasing in  because expected return is increasing in
the expected price of intermediate goods and, hence, in pc;RE (see A17 in the
appendix). Similarly, with KH = 
4KL investments by type-H individuals
are also increasing in . Moving to the bottom row of Figure 1, the left panel
depicts employment in both states of the world. At state "n" employment
is increasing in  because of the aforementioned e¤ects of the intervention
on investments and the complementarity in production between capital and
labor. In state "c" there is an added direct e¤ect due to the increased price
of the intermediate good (see A12 in the Appendix). Intuitively, in view of
the xed pre-negotiated wages, setting  = 0 leads to a sharp decrease in
labor demand (by about 20% in the numerical exercise) which exacerbates
the ine¢ ciency of the labor allocation. Raising  increases pc;RE and reduces
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the negative impact of a crisis on employment. This has a positive e¤ect on
the economy as depicted in the nal quadrant that plots the overall impact
of  on welfare.
The nding that it is desirable to remove all the toxic assets is clearly
specic to the above parameter choice.21 However, in the current setting
removing some toxic assets is always useful. To see why, consider the proof
of Proposition 3. We found that in the absence of a labor market the misal-
location of capital resulting from intervention led to WRE  0 with equality
at  = 0. Now, considering the labor market, observe that in the current
environment the equilibrium is always characterized by under-employment
relative to the e¢ cient solution. To see this simply note that wRE = 2= > 1
whereby the RHS of that inequality measures the workers marginal cost of
labor. However, since employers determine labor by equalizing the marginal
product of labor, MPL, to wage, it also implies MPL > 1. Accordingly, at
 = 0 intervention which increases employment must necessarily be welfare
improving. In addition, the existence of rents to workers implies that the
second generation always benets from increased values of  due to their
positive impact on employment.22
As noted above, except for buying out toxic assets our analysis does not
consider other corrective instruments. This again raises the question as to
whether including other policies might eliminate the need for intervention in
the context of the current extension. Here too we argue that this is unlikely.
Indeed, policies that improve e¢ ciency in the face of sticky wages are at the
focus of the new Keynesian literature. As is well known, such policies do
not fully alleviate the allocational ine¢ ciencies stemming from frictions in
the labor market. Once more, this leaves scope for intervention based on the
rationale developed in our analysis.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
Privatize prots and socialize losses? There is a prevailing view that social-
izing the losses by removing toxic assets in the recent crisis was justied due
to the unexpected nature of the event. At the same time, many agree that
21This extension has been designed to show the potential benets of removing toxic
assets on labor markets. In its simple form the corner solution obtains unless the crisis
probability becomes large. Considering distortionary taxation would clearly alter this
result.
22In line with this heuristic, it can be formally shown that with perfectly competitive
labor markets an analogous result to Proposition 3 would emerge. Intuitively, rational
expectations price and wages would adjusts to fully incorporate the market risk faced by
secondary goods buyers so that intervention would not be warranted.
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this policy should not be repeated in the future in order to avoid morally
hazardous behavior which would lead to a misallocation of resources. In
addition, many others doubt the soundness of the policy based on equity
concerns. The simple examples constructed above challenge these misgiv-
ings.
Specically, our analysis calls into question the standard heuristic argu-
ments against a tax nanced policy of removing toxic assets. Our examples
show that while the logical underpinning appears correct when limiting the
analysis only to the distortions associated with investment in risky assets,
embedding the question in a larger setting casts doubt on the reasoning. For
instance, in the extension of section 5.1 removing toxic assets continues to
have a negative impact on the allocation of savings across investment chan-
nels, yet it also has a positive e¤ect on search costs across generation. In
the second extension the increased investment induced by the commitment
to intervene also increases employment in all states of the world. Moreover,
during the crisis the policy stabilizes employment. As a result, a commitment
to remove some of the toxic assets becomes welfare enhancing.
The common feature responsible for the interventions positive welfare
implication in both extensions is the presence of a non-trivial dynamic link-
age across generations. Above and beyond the examples in the paper, there
are many other sources of such linkages. For instance, introducing risk aver-
sion in our framework would su¢ ce. Intuitively, intervention would become
desirable as the second generation is a¤ected by the risk of a crisis without
an ability to directly insure itself against it.23 Further linkages could be gen-
erated by any of the frictions invoked by the new Keynesian models or the
labor search literature which would prevent wages from fully adjusting to the
crisis. Accordingly, removing some of the toxic assets should have the same
benecial e¤ects as in our labor market setting. More generally, any dynamic
linkage that transfer the impact of a crisis across generations either ex-ante
(as in search for yield) or ex-post (as in the labor market example) is likely
to rationalize buying out some of the toxic assets.
For simplicity of analysis, our results have been derived using a three pe-
riods and two overlapping generation model. However, the main conclusions
should extend, or even be stronger, in a standard overlapping generations
framework which allows for the possibility of stochastically recurring crises.
First consider embedding the basic framework of section 3. A policy that
commits to remove toxic assets in case of a crisis should repeatedly yield a
23For an example, see Bental and Demougin (2014). In that analysis we use a stan-
dard overlapping generations framework with risk-averse agents. In that context we also
conclude that removing some of the toxic assets is useful.
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similar trade-o¤ as in our model; it would increase all investments which is
socially desirable for safe investments but not for potentially toxic assets.
With the same production functions as in our model, the negative impact
should continue to dominate and the knife-edge no-intervention result should
still also apply.
However, just as in our analysis, the no-intervention result will not be
robust. For instance, consider introducing a search for yield with dynamic
spillover e¤ects. A policy which removes a fraction of the toxic assets will
have the same e¤ect of increasing search. However, in an innite horizon
model repeated increases in search will clearly have an even stronger positive
e¤ect because it would benet all future generations. Similarly, with labor
market frictions the commitment to intervene would have a continued positive
impact on employment and output.
Finally, it could be argued that the indirect subsidies implied by our
intervention schemes should be applied directly. However, this is not al-
ways feasible. For instance, in the case of search for yield, governments
are unlikely to identify all sources of innovative activities (see footnote 9).
Moreover, applying direct subsidies for search and/or employment would re-
quire measures designed to avoid abuse. Therefore, in contrast to the simple
and "self-enforcing" policies analyzed in our paper, direct subsidies would be
associated in the very least with additional costs.
Other researchers have also argued in favor of removing toxic assets during
a nancial crisis. However, these arguments focused mainly on restoring trade
in capital markets that froze because of informational frictions. While these
concerns are fully justied, our goal was to examine the consistency of the
above critical voices even when capital markets do not break down. The
model we have developed for this purpose is highly stylized and qualitative
in nature. A quantitative analysis regarding the desired scope of intervention
would require the inclusion of many additional issues including the presence
of other policy measures, risk-aversion and the shadow price of taxation.
These are clearly out of the scope of the current paper and require further
research.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3: In order to simplify notation in the proof, we
write L = 1  H . Let
A(; H) = 
H(1  )2
1  H + H(1  )2
(A1)
so that
pRE = 1  A(; H) (A2)
Using the rst-generation rational expectations values for KREi from (2) and
the second-generation KREj from (13), we rewrite (23), as
WRE() = L
h
4
 
1 + pRE
   1 + pRE2i
+ H
2
h
2 (2  )  1 + pRE   1 + pRE2i+ 2X + 'L + 'H2 (A3)
Using (A2) and collecting common terms, we have
WRE() = (L + H
2)
 
4  [A(; H)]2

  2H2 (2  A(; H)) + 2X + 'L + 'H2
(A4)
Omitting arguments, the derivative of WRE() with respect to  becomes:
WRE = 2
LH
2
L + H(1  )2
A (A5)
Since
A =   LH
2
(L + H(1  )2)2
< 0 (A6)
we obtain WRE  0. Moreover, at  = 0 we get WRE = 0. We also have
WRE = 2
LH
2
L + H(1  )2
A + 2
LH
2 (L + H
2)
(L + H(1  )2)2
A (A7)
At  = 0 the rst element on the RHS is 0 so that WRE < 0 and also the
second-order condition holds. Consequently, welfare is maximized at exactly
 = 0. 
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Proof of Proposition 5: Based on (A4) we adjust the welfare function by
allowing it to account for search costs. Omitting arguments, we dene:
fW (; ; ') = (1  + 2)  4  [A(; )]2
  22 (2  A(; )) + 2X + 1  '+ '2    ()  (';)
(A8)
Accordingly, welfare at the rational expectations equilibrium becomes:
WRE () = fW (; RE(); 'RE()) (A9)
Taking derivative with respect to  yields:
dWRE
d
= fW +fWRE +fW''RE (A10)
Applying the logic of Proposition 3 yields fW(; RE(); 'RE()) = 0 at  =
0. Moreover, fW'(; RE(); 'RE())'RE () = 0 for any  by the envelope
theorem on (29). Accordingly, we obtain:
dWRE
d
= fWRE =   22 (2  A) + RE (A11)
Note that the term
  2  1  RE + RE2A+ 2RE2A which would
normally be part of (A11) takes the value 0 when evaluated at  = 0.
From Lemma 4, we know RE > 0. Accordingly,
dWRE
d
> 0 whenever
the condition 22 (2  A) +  < 0 is satised, thereby verifying the claim.
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Proof of Lemma 6: Using Assumption 1, the rst-order condition of (33)
becomes:
1 + ps
2
iK
0:25
i N
 0:5
i   w = 0 ) N si =
(1 + ps)2 2i
4w2
K0:5i . (A12)
Substituting (A12) into (34) and factorizing yields:
U(w) =

1  1
w
(
(1  ) + (1 + p
c)2
4
)
1  
w
K0:5L + 
2
w
K0:5H

.
(A13)
Also substituting (A12) back into the production function, we obtain:
iF (Ki; N
s
i ) + p
siG(Ki; N
s
i ) =
(1 + ps)2 2i
2w
(Ki)
1=2 . (A14)
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Using (A12) and (A14) in (33), it further implies:
(Ki; p
s; ws) =
(1 + ps)2 2iK
0:5
i
4w
(A15)
Accordingly, (35) takes the form:
AR(w) =

(1  ) +  (1+pc)2
4
 h
1 
w
K0:5L + 
2
w
K0:5H
i
   [(1  )KL + KH ]
(A16)
Equalizing (A13) and (A16) while cancelling common terms veries the claim.

Proof of Proposition 7: Taking w as given and using (A15) to solve the
investment decision of individual i yields:
Ki =
1
w2
 
1   +  (1 + p
c)2
4
!2
4i
4
(A17)
Taking Assumption 2 into account, it implies the relationship KH = 
4KL.
Using the characterization (37) of w(; ) at a point KH = 4KL allows us to
simplify for the wage:
w2 =
 
(1  ) + (1 + p
c)2
4
!
(KL)
 0:5

. (A18)
Accordingly, substitution into (A17) yields wRE = 2=. Finally, computing
is production of the intermediate good in state s, we have:
c =
(1  ) (1+pc)
2w
(KL)
1=2
(1  ) (1+pc)
2w
(KL)
1=2 + (1  ) (1+pc)2
2w
(KH)
1=2
(A19)
Together with KH = 
4KL, it veries (40). 
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